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The Drought and Food Crisis in the Horn of Africa: Impacts and 
Proposed Policy Responses for Kenya 
Gabriel Demombynes and Jane Kiringai
Impact of the Drought and the Rise in Food 
Prices
The drought 
In Kenya, more than 3.7 million people have been affected by 
the drought. The counties bordering Somalia in the north and 
east of the country have been the hardest hit. Drought-affected 
areas are also coping with the influx of refugees travelling from 
neighboring Somalia to the Dadaab refugee camp, creating an 
additional burden in the region that is now home to the largest 
refugee camp in the world. 
The drought-stricken region holds about 31 percent of Ke-
nya’s livestock, which is at risk from the debilitating effects of 
the drought. Livestock is the main source of livelihood in arid 
lands and accounts for about 5 percent of total GDP. Estimated 
livestock mortality as a result of the current drought is about 
10–15 percent above normal in the affected areas, equivalent 
to 5 percent of Kenya’s livestock population. 
Beyond the direct impact in the drought-stricken areas, the 
drought has contributed to food inflation across the country. 
Food inflation is driven by both a shortfall in production and 
the increase in global prices. While prices have dropped from 
their July 2011 peak, as of October, the price for a 90 kilogram 
bag of maize stood at US$43, which is 55 percent above world 
market prices and double the price of a year earlier. 
Agriculture policy and trade policy distortions are com-
pounding the drought’s impacts. Kenya is a food deficit country 
even in a bumper harvest year, yet the country levies import 
duty on food grains that are only suspended on an ad hoc basis 
in times of crisis. The East African Community  customs union 
partners also impose export bans on cereals when Kenya experi-
ences a food crisis, and the country pursues a high food pro-
ducer price policy. 
The combined economic impact of the drought and related 
shocks is estimated to cost the economy approximately 0.7–
1.0 percent of GDP. However, the direct impact of the drought 
As the world begins to feel the effects of climate change, the frequency of droughts is increasing in the Horn of Africa. In 
Kenya, the drought and food crisis affect welfare through two main channels. The first channel is the increased mortality of 
livestock in drought-affected areas, which are home to 10 percent of the country’s population. The second channel is by 
exacerbating increases in food prices, which are largely driven by worldwide price trends. Considering these two channels, 
this note identifies four broad policy changes that can reduce Kenya’s future vulnerability to such shocks: (i) investment in 
people in the arid and semiarid lands; (ii) reform of Kenya’s maize policy; (iii) review of the East African Community 
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on output is estimated to be mild—a decline of 0.2 percent—
due to the loss of livestock. The economy will slow down by an 
additional 0.5–0.8 percent as the result of lower than normal 
rainfall in the first half of the year in Kenya’s agricultural heart-
land and a number of external shocks. 
Food security is expected to improve to a crisis status (down 
from the humanitarian disaster phase) in pastoral areas of Ke-
nya by the end of 2011. This  more  favorable  outlook  is  due   
to  the  forecast  for  near  normal  to  above  normal rains,  ongo-
ing  relief  interventions,  and  expected declines in staple food 
prices.
Poverty impacts
The seven counties most affected by the drought have an aver-
age poverty rate of 73 percent, with Turkana registering a pov-
erty rate of 90 percent, the highest in Kenya. The main impacts 
of the drought come through two channels. First, there is a di-
rect effect on the lives of those living in drought-stricken areas, 
mainly through the increased mortality of livestock. The sec-
ond channel is the rise in food prices, which is partially a conse-
quence of the drought in Kenya’s arid areas and partially due to 
below normal rainfalls in the crop-producing regions, which 
are elsewhere in the country. 
Livestock is the principle source of livelihood in the arid ar-
eas. Fifty-eight percent of households in the seven drought-af-
fected counties own livestock, with goats and sheep the most 
common assets. Other livestock included in the statistics pre-
sented here include cattle, camels, and donkeys. On average, 
families own 42 animals. Even in nondrought years, house-
holds in the arid lands are highly vulnerable to shocks, and live-
stock mortality is high. In a 2005–6 national survey, the aver-
age livestock-owning household in the region reported that 
nearly half of their livestock died in the previous year, a mortal-
ity rate twice the national average. 
Droughts overwhelm traditional coping mechanisms em-
ployed by pastoralists. Households with livestock manage mor-
tality risk by moving their herds in response to rainfall varia-
tion. They also have social insurance arrangements that provide 
for the transfer of a breeding cow when they suffer severe losses. 
However, these schemes are in decline, do not cover everyone, 
and fail in the face of a drought that affects all households over 
a wide area simultaneously.
Impacts of changes in maize production and prices differ 
across socioeconomic groups. The impact of increases in maize 
prices varies depending on whether a given household is a net 
buyer or seller of maize. The greatest effects of maize price 
shocks are felt by Kenyans who are net buyers and make up the 
majority of the Kenyan poor, including the urban poor, who are 
entirely net buyers. Households that are net sellers of maize, a 
small but politically influential group of less than 2 percent of 
Kenya’s farmers, are the major beneficiaries of Kenya’s high pro-
ducer prices. 
To estimate the overall effects of the rise in maize prices and 
the decline in maize production, this analysis employed a simu-
lation approach using the Kenya Integrated Household Budget 
Survey and current data on price and production changes. 
Overall, areas most negatively affected by maize price shocks 
are those where poverty rates were already high. Marginally, the 
greatest increase in the poverty headcount is in the eastern 
province. Net producers of maize in the western Rift Valley 
have benefited from higher prices.
Proposed Policy Responses
Given the two main effects of the drought—livestock mortality 
in the arid and semiarid lands and rising maize prices national-
ly—there are four broad policy changes that can reduce Kenya’s 
vulnerability to drought: i) investment in people in the arid and 
semiarid lands; ii) reform of Kenya’s maize policy; iii) review of 
grain trade policy; and vi) strengthening of the social protection 
system. 
Investment in people in the arid and semiarid lands 
Over the last decade, Kenya as a whole has achieved strong 
growth, driven by its diversified and urbanizing economy. The 
areas afflicted by the drought are Kenya’s arid lands, which have 
the highest poverty rates and the lowest population density in 
the country. The gap between the more prosperous parts of Ke-
nya and the poorer arid lands presents a case of lagging and lead-
ing regions similar to the situation faced in many countries 
across the globe. A crucial question facing policy makers is 
what type of public investment should be made in the lagging 
areas. The World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report 
(WDR): Reshaping Economic Geography provides a framework 
to address this question.
Underlying the framework is the observation that across the 
world, the overwhelming historical pattern has been for devel-
% of households that own
County Livestock Cattle
Sheep 
and goats Camels Donkeys
Garissa 44 28 41 5
Isiolo 60 45 49 4 27
Mandera 49 27 40 11 15
Marsabit 70 37 54 20 6
Tana River 49 29 45 2 1
Turkana 51 2 50 2 7
Wajir 87 51 77 27 3
Drought-affected 
counties
58 28 52 10 6
All Kenya 50 38 32 1 3
Source: World Bank projections using Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 
2005/6 data. 
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opment to take place as people move from poor, sparsely popu-
lated areas to leading areas. This is the pattern in rapidly devel-
oping countries today, such as China, which has seen massive 
migration from the poor, sparsely populated west to the coastal 
region. The same pattern is seen in Brazil, with migration from 
the poor, less densely populated regions to the southeast.
The forces pulling people away from areas such as arid lands 
are reinforced by climate change. The literature on climate 
change recognizes that migration is a principal tool people use 
to adapt. As global temperatures rise and droughts become 
more frequent, migration from arid areas will increasingly ap-
peal to communities.
In light of the insights from historical patterns and theory 
on economic geography, the WDR framework recommends a 
set of policy approaches addressing the “3 Is”— institutions, infra-
structure, and incentives:
•	 Institutions include both those that ensure equality of op-
portunity in areas like education, health care, food security 
and basic services, and those that provide a regulatory 
framework such as property rights, land tenure regimes, 
transport, and urban development regulations. Ensuring 
that institutions are spatially blind should be the primary 
approach for most countries. 
•	 Infrastructure refers to spatially connective policies aimed at 
connecting places and markets. Prime examples are inter-
regional highways and railroads to promote trade and im-
proving information and communication technologies to 
stimulate the flow of ideas. This approach should supple-
ment the focus on institutions in countries where lagging 
areas have large numbers of poor people and impediments 
to mobility. 
•	 Incentives refer to spatially focused policies to stimulate eco-
nomic growth in lagging areas, such as investment subsi-
dies, tax rebates, location regulations, local infrastructure 
development and targeted investment climate reforms, 
such as special regulations for export processing zones. 
This approach can complement the focus on institutions 
and infrastructure in areas fragmented by linguistic, po-
litical, religious or ethnic divisions, which cause these ar-
eas to be particularly likely to suffer from coordination 
failures and poverty traps.
The fact that many now living in arid lands—particularly the 
children—will migrate to other areas strongly recommends a 
primary focus on institutions, especially those that help people 
migrate to places with economic opportunities. High priority 
should be given to guaranteeing access to quality basic servic-
es—particularly education and health care—regardless of one’s 
location. Given the low population density in the arid lands 
and their remoteness, the cost of delivering these services will 
be high. This cost is justified for two reasons: to ensure equal 
opportunities for children from arid areas and to promote eco-
nomic growth.
Given the low population density in the arid lands in the 
region, a focus on spatially connective infrastructure and tar-
geted incentives is less advisable. Substantial development of 
roads—the chief form of spatially connective infrastructure—is 
likely to be prohibitively expensive in the arid lands, and the 
track record of incentive-type programs is generally weak. 
Nonetheless, the mobile phone revolution and the rise of mo-
bile money have introduced a new form of spatially connective 
infrastructure and have helped some cope with the drought by 
providing a lifeline through remittances. To the extent that in-
centive-type programs can be successful, historical experience 
suggests they need to build upon policies that foster institu-
tions and ensure equality of opportunity. Without laying the 
foundations through a principal focus on institutions, targeted 
incentives are unlikely to succeed.
Overall, the WDR framework suggests recalibrating priori-
ties for the arid lands. The future welfare for people in these 
communities is likely to be driven largely by migration to areas 
of economic concentration. The top priority for government 
investment and migrant remittances should be ensuring basic 
education and health care for children in arid areas.
Agriculture policy
Because maize is Kenya’s major food staple, efficient maize mar-
keting is critical to food security, poverty reduction, and pro-
ducer incentives. The operations of the National Cereals Pro-
duction Board (NCPB) have raised the price of maize by fixing 
a price floor well above market levels, with the result that Ke-
nya’s maize prices are among the highest in Africa, yet without 
generating the expected supply response. It is important to un-
derstand why.
The government has intervened in maize markets in ways 
that keep maize prices high and have little impact on price stabil-
ity (figure 1). Liberalization opened maize markets to the private 
sector and reduced marketing margins and prices. However, the 
NCPB remains a major player in the market among medium- 

















































































Figure 1. Kenya Maize Prices are Higher Than Global Prices
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics; World Bank estimates. 4  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
shocks on households. Across Africa, countries with well-de-
signed, operational safety nets have been able to respond more 
effectively to crises, protecting human capital investments and 
preventing people from falling into poverty, while jumpstart-
ing economic recovery. The response to the current drought in 
East Africa has again validated this approach.
The government of Kenya recognizes the potential of safety 
nets to effectively mitigate the impacts of the drought. The gov-
ernment has harnessed its existing safety nets to provide addi-
tional support to people most affected by the drought and food 
price inflation. However, these and the government’s other 
safety net programs are comparatively new and  operate mostly 
as pilots. They are limited in coverage and their systems and 
structures are not yet sufficiently robust to enable a rapid scale-
up to new beneficiaries. 
The government of Kenya’s draft social protection policy ad-
dresses these shortcomings and aims to strengthen the ability 
of safety net programs to respond to crises. Policy implementa-
tion will require increased financing for social protection. 
There is potential to increase safety net coverage through effi-
ciency gains within the current budget. Most notably, spending 
on emergency food aid, which is relatively costly and not always 
very effective, could be reallocated to longer-term and more ef-
ficient programs. Currently, about 86 percent of safety net 
spending is allocated to emergency relief. At the same time, 
overall spending for long-term safety nets is at relatively low lev-
els (around 0.25 percent of GDP); government will need to in-
crease the financing for these programs over time. 
These investments will not only improve crisis response, 
but will also build more resilient livelihoods. A growing body 
of evidence shows that safety nets are an important comple-
ment to efforts to improve the livelihoods of the poor, partic-
ularly in areas that remain vulnerable to shocks such as 
drought. Reliable access to safety net support allows house-
holds to take on more investment risk and thus produce high-
er returns. 
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Rift Valley, where it sets prices and provides some degree of sta-
bilization. Smallholders have little interaction with NCPB. Pres-
ently, only 2 percent of smallholders sell to the cereals board. 
NCPB’s maize market interventions are generally antipoor in the 
sense that high prices paid to large-scale farmers negatively im-
pact consumers—especially poor urban households and the ma-
jority of poor rural households, which are net buyers of maize. 
Despite the harmonization of formal maize import tariff 
rates, both tariff and nontariff barriers to regional trade con-
tinue to cause domestic maize prices to rise.  Given that Kenya 
is consistently a net importer of maize, a policy of restricting 
imports necessarily harms Kenyan consumers, who bear the ad-
ditional tax burden. 
Relatively high global maize prices due to structural change 
in the energy markets provide an opportunity for NCPB to re-
duce its role in the market and move to a more transparent, co-
ordinated system with minimal dislocation to surplus maize 
farmers in western Kenya. As a first step, NCPB could use trans-
parent rules for setting buying and selling prices for maize. This 
step would require NCPB to move away from pan-seasonal buy-
ing and selling prices (prices that are constant throughout the 
marketing year), which eliminate incentives for grain storage. 
Price stability could also be enhanced through the intraregional 
grain trade, which could be furthered by investing in market 
infrastructure; reducing trade restrictions and interventions; 
reducing nontariff barriers to trade; streamlining customs pro-
cedures; and harmonizing quality, safety, and phytosanitary 
standards with neighboring countries.
Private storage could be encouraged by turning some NCPB 
grain silos and go-downs into storage-leasing operations. Addi-
tional storage facilities, coupled with better financing arrange-
ments, could help the commercialized grain marketing system 
to weather downside price risk. These efforts could be com-
bined with a warehouse receipt system to help farmers and 
traders get access to formal credit markets and would improve 
the efficiency of the food marketing system in general. 
Implementing these reforms would open space for market-
based risk management instruments through a commodity ex-
change with forward and futures markets. Most importantly, 
the government could provide a predictable policy environment 
that does not destroy the incentives for private individuals and 
firms to trade market-based risk management instruments.
Scale-up and integrate social protection programs 
The global food, fuel, and financial crises have demonstrated 
the vital role that safety nets play in mitigating the impact of 
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